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ATTORNEY LIABILITY IN THE WAKE OF WILLIAMS
v. ELY
I. INTRODUCTION

In Williams v. Ely,' the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reaffirmed many of the established elements of legal malpractice. The court,
however, appeared to expand liability in holding that "the absence of a
guarantee does not ... foreclose liability for the adverse consequences of a2
negligent failure to advise a client of the uncertainty of the advice given."
The Supreme Judicial Court held the defendant attorneys liable for not informing their clients of the uncertainty of the law on the issue of disclaiming a contingent remainder interest for federal gift tax purposes.3 The
court stated that the advice the firm provided was a reasonable view of the
law at the time it was given. The court, however, held that the attorneys
failed to disclose to the plaintiffs that the law was unsettled and that there
5
was some degree of risk that the law might shift against their position.
Because the law constantly evolves, the Supreme Judicial Court's decision
in Williams may leave many Massachusetts attorneys wondering whether
they may give legal advice or opinions to clients without liability for future
unforeseen shifts in the law. This article will discuss the implications of
the court's holding on an attorney's duty and liability to his client when the
law is unsettled in a particular area.
II.

CASE IN CHIEF

In Williams, the plaintiffs held contingent remainders in testamentary
trusts. 6

They brought a legal malpractice action against partners of the

now defunct law firm of Gaston Snow & Ely Bartlett ("Gaston Snow").
The plaintiffs based their suit on the failure of Gaston Snow's attorneys to
properly advise them of the risk of federal gift tax consequences for persons disclaiming a remainder interest in a trust. 7 The action commenced
on February 4, 1988.8 The issue of liability was separated for trial, and in
June of 1991, the Superior Court made findings and rulings and ordered

1423 Mass. 467, 668 N.E.2d 799 (1996).
2

Id. at 477, 668 N.E.2d at 806.

3 Id. at 476,668 N.E.2d at 806.
4 id.
6

Id.
Williams v. Ely, 423 Mass. 467, 469, 668 N.E.2d 799, 802 (1996).

7 id.

8 Id.
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judgment for the plaintiffs. 9 In October of 1991, Gaston Snow filed for
bankruptcy.' 0 In May of 1992, the bankruptcy judge allowed the plaintiffs
to liquidate their claims." The bankruptcy trustee and plaintiffs settled
claims against those partners who elected to participate in the bankruptcy
reorganization plan.' 2 The Supreme Judicial Court, on its own motion,
transferred cross appeals regarding the remaining partners and plaintiffs. 3
The cause of action arose in October 1975, when Ralph Williams, a
vice president of The Fiduciary Trust Company, consulted his cousin,
Charles Jackson, a partner of Gaston Snow, as to whether he could effectively disclaim his contingent interests under the family trusts without
creating any federal gift and estate tax liability.' 4 Jackson referred the
question to a partner in the firm's estate planning division who subsequently circulated a memorandum among the tax and estate planning part-6
ners. 5 The tax and estate planning partners approved the memorandum.,
In November 1975, Jackson advised Williams that a disclaimer of his interest would not give rise to federal gift and estate tax liability. 7 In January 1976, Gaston Snow sent Williams a letter unequivocally stating the
firm's opinion on the issue.'
In December 1975, Williams executed two disclaimers prepared and
filed by Gaston Snow in the appropriate registries of probate, renouncing
his remainder interests in the family trusts.' 9 In November and December,
1976, his siblings, Thomas B. Williams and Frances W. Perkins, relied on
Gaston Snow's advice and disclaimed their contingent interests.20 In December 1976, Ralph Williams prepared the disclaimers and Gaston Snow
billed the siblings for services concerning the disclaimers. 2' The firm,
however, did not file them in the proper registries of probate until 1977. 22

9 Id.
10

Id.

" Williams v. Ely, 423 Mass. 467, 469, 668 N.E.2d 799, 802 (1996).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 id.

15Id.
16 Williams v. Ely, 423 Mass. 467, 469, 668 N.E.2d 799, 802 (1996).
Id. at 469-70, 668 N.E.2d at 802.
"8Id. at 470, 668 N.E.2d at 802.
'7

19 Id.
20 Id.

21Williams v. Ely, 423 Mass. 467, 470, 668 N.E.2d 799, 802 (1996).
22

Id. at 470, 668 N.E.2d at 802.
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The Superior Court Judge found that in 1975 there was a risk of federal gift tax consequences for a person disclaiming a remainder interest in
a trust.23 The court stated that the law was unsettled as to whether the
holder of a contingent remainder interest must disclaim his interest within
a reasonable time of learning of its existence or within a reasonable time
after the remainder interest vested in order to avoid adverse tax consequences.24 The court, therefore, held that a competent estate planning attorney at that time would advise a client that the law was unsettled on the
issue.
26
In 1961, the United States Tax Court in Fuller v. Commissioner
took the position that a party must make a disclaimer within a reasonable
time of learning of the existence of an interest. 27 The tax court reaffirmed
its decision in 1972 in Keinath v. Commissioner.28 In 1973, however, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed Keinath and
held that a disclaimer made within a reasonable time after the interest
vested produced no adverse federal gift tax consequences. 2 The Eighth
Circuit's decision did not effect any other circuit, and, as of 1975-1976, the
Internal Revenue Service had not indicated that it acquiesced in the decision.3 ° It was under these circumstances that Gaston Snow advised the
plaintiffs that they would suffer no federal gift tax liability if they disclaimed their interests.
The Superior Court in Williams found that the attorneys failed to warn
their clients that the IRS might oppose the Eighth Circuit's holding in
Keinath.31 If successful, this would create a conflict in the circuits which
2
might prompt the United States Supreme Court to grant certiorari.1 If it
did, the United States Supreme Court might overrule the Eighth Circuit's
decision in Keinath.33 The Superior Court held that "it was this risk of
which Gaston Snow gave the plaintiffs no hint."3 4 On February 23, 1982,

23

Id.

24

id.

25

Id.

26

37 T.C. 147 (1961).
Id. at 152-55.
2' 58 T.C. 352, 357 (1972).
29 480 F.2d 57, 63-66 (8th Cir. 1973) (reversing the Tax Court's 1972 decision).
27

30Williams v. Ely, 423 Mass. 467,471,668 N.E.2d 799, 803 (1996).
31 Id.
32 id.

33Id.
34 Id.
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the possibility became a reality when the Supreme Court of the United
States, reviewing Jewett v. Commissioner,35 upheld the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 36 In its decision, the
Court announced that the holder of a contingent interest must make a disclaimer within a reasonable time of learning of the interest in order to
avoid gift tax liability, thereby overruling Keinath.37
The Williams court found that an attorney client relationship existed
between the firm and Ralph Williams' siblings even though the lawyers
did not deal with them directly. The court also found that the plaintiffs'
earliest notice of the attorneys' negligence was on December 1984 when
Gaston Snow advised Ralph Williams that he and his siblings had a federal
gift tax liability due to the disclaimers.39 In 1986, plaintiffs filed gift tax
returns for the period in which they filed disclaimers and paid all gift tax
liabilities, including interest. 4 ° The court found that the plaintiffs incurred
these liabilities by following Gaston Snow's advice that their disclaimers
would not create federal gift tax liability. 4' Additionally, Gaston Snow's
failure to advise them to file gift tax returns in 1975 or shortly thereafter
caused the statute of limitations to begin running on any gift tax liability
arguably flowing from the disclaimers. 42 The court held that those partners who opted out of the bankruptcy reorganization and were partners at
the time of the execution of a tolling agreement between the plaintiffs and
the firm were bound by the agreement.4 3 This action, therefore, was

31455 U.S. 305 (1982), affg 638 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1980).
36638 F.2d 93, 95 (rejecting result in Keinath). But see id. at 96 (Harris, J.,
dissenting). Judge Harris argued that the court should refrain from overturning the Keinath
decision because "numerous tax practitioners have undoubtedly relied on this opinion in
advising as to the tax consequences of such acts as are involved in the instant case and
justifiably so!" Id.
37Jewett, 455 U.S. at 318 (affirming Ninth Cicuit decision by 6 to 3). But see id. at
324 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Dist. Judge Harris' dissent in lower court's decision).
"I agree stability in tax law is desirable. Except for the Tax Court, the pronounced law
appeared to have achieved a level of stability after Keinath." Id.
38 See Williams v. Ely, 423 Mass. 467, 471,668 N.E.2d 799, 803 (1996).
39id.
4 id.
41 Id.
42 Id.

43Williams v. Ely, 423 Mass. 467, 471,668 N.E.2d 799, 803 (1996).
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within the three year statute of limitations for malpractice claims in Massachusetts.44
III. STATE OF LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS

In a suit for legal malpractice the plaintiff must establish four elements to recover. These include: (1) the existence of an attorney-client
relationship; (2) the attorney failed to exercise reasonable care and skill;
(3) the attorney's negligence proximately caused plaintiffs injury; and (4)
the plaintiff suffered actual damages. 45
A. The Existence of an Attorney Client Relationship
In general, an attorney owes no duty to anyone other than his client
for legal malpractice.
A plaintiff must establish the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a threshold requirement. 47 The Massachusetts
courts, however, have held that:
An attorney-client relationship need not rest on an express contract. An
attorney-client relationship may be implied when (1) a person seeks advice or assistance from an attorney, (2) the advice or assistance sought
pertains to matters within the attorney's professional competence and (3)
the attorney expressly or impliedly
agrees to give or actually gives the de48
assistance.
or
advice
sired

"Id. at 472, 668 N.E.2d at 804.
45 See Fishman v. Brooks, 396 Mass. 643, 646-47, 487 N.E.2d 1377, 1379-80 (1986)
(holding expert testimony as to reasonable settlement value admissible to prove negligence
and loss). See also Collucci v. Rosen, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 107, 111-13, 515 N.E.2d 891,
894-95 (1987) (stating the elements of legal malpractice); DiPiero v. Goodman, 14 Mass.
App. Ct. 929, 929-30, 436 N.E.2d 998, 999 (1982) (holding that plaintiff failed to establish
breach of duty, loss, and proximate cause); Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 597,
598-99, 427 N.E.2d 1169, 1170 (1981) (holding existence of attorney client relationship,
standard of care, and causation are questions for jury).
46 See DeVaux v. American Home Assurance Co., 387 Mass. 814, 817, 444 N.E.2d
355, 357 (1983).
47 See Kurtenbach v. TeKippe, 260 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Iowa 1977). See also Fanaras
Enterprises, Inc. v. Doane, 423 Mass. 121, 124, 666 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (1996) (holding
that plaintiff has burden of proving attorney client relationship in legal malpractice action);
DaRoza v. Arter, 416 Mass. 377, 381, 622 N.E.2d 604, 607 (1993) (holding injured
employee failed to establish relationship with attorneys for employer's workers
compensation carrrier).
48 DeVaux, 387 Mass at 817-18, 444 N.E.2d at 357 (quoting Kurtenbach, 260 N.W.
2d at 56). Accord Fanaras,423 Mass. at 124-25, 666 N.E.2d at 1006; DaRoza, 416 Mass.
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All three must be met to demonstrate the existence of an attorney-client
relationship. 49

Although an attorney's liability for legal malpractice generally extends only to a client, she "is not absolutely immune from liability to nonclients. '50 Therefore, the third element may be established by demonstrating that an attorney owed a duty to a non-client based on a foreseeable reliance, apparent authority, or third-party beneficiary theory.5 ' To establish
foreseeable reliance, the plaintiff must prove he reasonably relied on the
defendant attorney's advice, that the attorney should have reasonably foreseen such reliance by the plaintiff, and the attorney did nothing to prevent

at 381, 622 N.E.2d at 607; Robertson v. Gaston Snow, 404 Mass. 515, 526, 536 N.E.2d
344, 351 n.8 (1989); Page v. Frasier, 388 Mass. 55, 62, 445 N.E.2d 148, 152 (1983).
49DaRoza, 416 Mass at 381, 622 N.E.2d at 607.
5oPage, 388 Mass. at 65, 445 N.E.2d at 154. But see One National Bank v.
Antonellis, 80 F.3d 606, 609 (1st Cir. 1996) (concurring but holding that assignee of
secured mortgage could not sue mortgagee's attorney for negligent title certification);
Spinner v. Nutt, 417 Mass. 549, 552, 63i N.E.2d 542, 544 (1994) (quoting Page but
holding that trustee's attorney owed no duty to trust beneficiaries).
51See Craig v. Everett Brooks, 351 Mass. 497, 501, 222 N.E.2d 752, 756 (1967)
(introducing the concept of forseeable reliance and liability to third parties in tort cases).
See also Spinner, 417 Mass. at 552, 631 N.E.2d at 544 (quoting Robertson, 404 Mass at
524, 536 N.E.2d at 350). The Spinner court held "[a]n attorney owes a duty to non-clients
who the attorney knows will reasonably rely on the services rendered." 417 Mass. at 552,
631 N.E.2d at 544; Logotheti v. Gordon, 414 Mass. 308, 311, 607 N.E.2d 1015, 1017
(1993) (holding attorneys owe a duty to intended beneficiaries).
Courts in other jurisdictions have held that in some circumstances at least an
attorney owes to the intended beneficiaries of a competent testator a duty to
excercise reasonable care and skill in the drafting of will provisions that are
enforceable and in making sure that the will is properly executed and witnessed
.... In those cases, there is no conflict between the duty the attorney owes to
his client and the duty the attorney owes to intended beneficiaries.
414 Mass. at 311, 607 N.E.2d at 1017 (citing favorably Lucas v. Harm, 56 Cal. 2d 583,
364 P.2d 685 (1961)); DeVaux, 387 Mass. at 819, 444 N.E.2d at 358 (holding whether
plaintiff reasonably relied on the apparent authority of attorney's secretary is question for
jury); Kirkland Construction v. James, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 559, 561, 658 N.E.2d 699, 701
(1995). "Under certain circumstances a lawyer owes a duty to a non-client who he or she
knows will rely on the services rendered." 39 Mass. App. Ct. at 561, 658 N.E.2d at 701;
Chatterjee v. Glynn, No. 931912, 1994 WL 879735, at *3 (Mass. Super. Jan. 28, 1994)
(holding intended beneficiary of testatator's will the very type of person protected by third
party beneficiary status).
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such reliance. 52 A claim of actual reliance by the plaintiff is not sufficient.
It must be shown that the attorney knew or should have reasonably fore53
seen that the non-client would rely on his legal services or advice.
Where a conflict of duties arises between an actual client and a foreseeable third party, the court will not impose a duty to the non-client.5 4 A
potential conflict is enough to preclude finding a duty owed to the nonclient. 55 An attorney never owes a duty to his client's adversary.56 To
52

See Robertson, 404 Mass. at 524, 536 N.E.2d at 349-50; see also Lamare v.

Basbanes, 418 Mass. 274, 276, 636 N.E.2d 218, 219 (1994) (discussing an attorney's duty
to non-clients). "Absent an attorney client relationship, the court will recognize a duty of
reasonable care if an attorney knows or has reason to know a non-client is relying on the
services rendered." 418 Mass. at 276, 636 N.E.2d at 219 (citing Spinner and Robertson);
Page, 388 Mass. at 64, 445 N.E.2d at 153-54. "Recovery under the principles of Craig is
limited to instances 'where the defendant knew that the plaintiff would rely on his
services."' 388 Mass. at 64, 445 N.E.2d at 153-54.
53 See DaRoza, 416 Mass. 377, 384, 622 N.E.2d 604, 608 n.7 (1993) (holding a claim
of reliance is insufficient to establish a duty). "Claimed reliance by the non-client is not
dispositive. It must be shown that the attorney should reasonably forsee that the non-client
will rely upon him for legal services." Id. See also Spinner, 417 Mass. at 555-56, 631
N.E.2d at 546-47 (holding trust beneficiaries are only incidental, not intended beneficiaries
of relationship between defendant attorneys and trustees). The Spinner court concluded
that, "an incidental benefit does not suffice to impose a duty upon the attorney." 417 Mass.
at 555-56, 631 N.E.2d at 546-47 (quoting Goldberg v. Frye, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1258, 126869, 266 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1990)). See also Best v. Rome, 858 F. Supp. 271, 276 (D. Mass.
1994) (deciding that Union's attorney not liable to individual member on third party
beneficiary theory); Sheinkopf v. Stone, 741 F. Supp. 323, 324 (D. Mass. 1990). The
Sheinkopf court stated that there was no attorney client relationship where plaintiff claimed
he relied on defendant attorney because plaintiff knew he was an attorney and did not seek
advice of his own attorney. 741 F. Supp. at 324. There was no communication to the
attorney by word or deed of plaintiff's reliance on attorney's advice and, therefore, there
was no foreseeable reliance. Id.
54 See, e.g., Lamare,418 Mass. at 276, 636 N.E.2d at 219 (holding husband's attorney
owed no duty to wife and child in divorce and sexual abuse proceedings); Logotheti, 414
Mass. at 312, 607 N.E.2d at 1018 (refusing to impose on testator's attorney a conflicting
duty to heirs who benefit by intestacy); Robertson v. Gaston Snow, 404 Mass. 515, 525, 536
N.E.2d 344, 350 (1989) (holding no attorney client relationship existed between law firm
representing corporation and former corporate officer).
55See Spinner v. Nutt, 417 Mass. 549, 554, 631 N.E.2d 542, 546 (1994). "Our
decisions make it clear that it is the potential for conflict that prevents the imposition of a
duty on the defendants." Id. (citing DaRoza, 416 Mass. at 383-84, 622 N.E.2d at 608); One
National Bank v. Antonellis, 80 F.3d 606, 609 (1st Cir. 1996). "Massachusetts and federal
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find such a duty would create
an unacceptable conflict of interest, inimical
57
to the adversarial system.
Furthermore, an attorney's liability extends only to advice given
within the scope of his professional competence.58 The plaintiff cannot
base his claim on prior, subsequent, or even contemporaneous representation, but "must establish that the relationship existed with respect to the act
or omission upon which the malpractice claim is based., 59 An attorney,
therefore, may represent a client in numerous matters without creating an
attorney-client relationship as to another. 6° The trier of fact must resolve
whether or not an attorney-client relationship existed.6'
B. Excercise of Reasonable Careand Skill

case law has consistently found that a potential conflict between an attorney's duty to his or
her client and the alleged duty to the non-client is sufficient to defeat the non-client's
malpractice claim." 80 F.3d at 609; Robertson, 404 Mass. at 524, 536 N.E.2d at 350; Page
v. Frasier, 388 Mass 55, 63, 445 N.E.2d 148, 148 (1983).
56 Lamare, 418 Mass. at 276, 636 N.E.2d
at 219.
57 Beecy v. Pucciarelli, 387 Mass. 589, 597, 441 N.E.2d 1035, 1040-41 (1982)
(holding attorney not liable to his client's adversary for professional negligence).
58 Sheinkopf v. Stone, 741 F. Supp. 323, 324 (D. Mass. 1990) (holding no attorneyclient relationship where advice relied upon was outside the scope of attorney's
competence). The plaintiff attempted to hold attorney and firm liable for poor financial
advice. Id.
59 Page, 388 Mass. at 62, 445 N.E.2d at 152 n.10. Accord Fanaras Enterprises, Inc. v.
Doane, 423 Mass. 121, 125, 666 N.E.2d 1003, 1006 (1996) (holding no attorney client
relationship with respect to business loans made by client to attorney). But see 423 Mass. at
126-27, 666 N.E.2d at 1007 (Fried, J., dissenting) (arguing jury might find attorney-client
relationship where general retainer agreement existed).
60 Robertson v. Gaston Snow, 404 Mass. 515, 522, 536 N.E.2d 344, 348-49 (1989).
"ITlhe fact that an attorney agreed to, or did, represent a client in a particular matter does
not necessarily create an attorney-client relationship as to other matters or affairs of that
client." Id. (citing DeVaux v. American Home Assurance Co., 387 Mass. 814, 816, 444
N.E.2d. 355, 357 n.6).
61 See DeVaux, 387 Mass. 814, 818, 444 N.E.2d 355, 357 (1983) (holding trier of
fact determines existence of attorney-client relationship). "Where reasonable persons could
differ as to the existence of an attorney-client relationship, this issue must be resolved by the
trier of fact." Id. (quoting Kurtenbach v. TeKippe, 260 N.W. 2d 53, 57); see also
Robertson, 404 Mass at 522, 536 N.E.2d at 348 (following Page and DeVaux); Page, 388
Mass. at 61, 445 N.E.2d at 152 (holding plaintiff did not establish an express or implied
attorney client relationship).
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An attorney owes his client the general duty to exercise the degree of
skill and care of the average qualified practitioner in the performance of
his legal duties. 62 This includes the full disclosure of all facts material to
the client's interests so that he may make an informed decision between
alternatives. 63 Where an attorney holds himself out as a specialist in a
specific area of the law, he will be held to the higher standard of specialists
in the area. 64 An attorney who is not a specialist and takes on a case that is
beyond his skill and training may be liable for malpractice. 65 Although
Massachusetts has not adopted a specific rule on the issue of locality, the
courts have adopted a state jurisdictional standard as opposed to a local
standard. 66 The question of whether Massachusetts will adopt a national
standard remains unanswered.67
The courts generally require expert testimony in order to establish the
standard of care in a particular situation and the defendant attorney's
breach of duty." Expert testimony is not necessary, however, "where the
62

See Fishman v. Brooks, 396 Mass. 643, 646, 487 N.E.2d 1377, 1379 (1986). "An

attorney who violates this duty is liable to his client for any reasonably foreseeable loss
caused by his negligence." Id.; see also McLellan v. Fuller, 226 Mass. 374, 377-78, 115
N.E. 481, 481-82 (1917) (holding that cause of action exists); Glidden v. Terranova, 12
Mass. App. Ct. 597, 598, 427 N.E.2d 1169, 1170 (1981) (reversing directed verdict stating
whether attorney violated standard of care and caused injury were jury questions).
63 See Hendrickson v. Sears, 365 Mass. 83, 90, 310 N.E.2d 131, 135 (1974).
64 See David A. Barry, Legal MalpracticeIn Massachusetts:Recent Developments, 78
MASS. L. REV. 74, 77 (1993).
65 Id. See also Fishman, 396 Mass. at 646, 487 N.E.2d at 1379. An attorney who had
not tried a case in fourteen years was found negligent for advising his client to settle a
personal injury claim for well below what a competent attorney would have advised. 396
Mass. at 646, 487 N.E.2d at 1379. Accord Colucci v. Rosen, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 107, 112,
515 N.E.2d 891, 894 (1987). The Colucci court stated that lack of experience in a
specialized area of law may furnish a basis for malpractice liability when the attorney
undertakes a matter beyond his skill level. 25 Mass. App. Ct. at 112, 515 N.E.2d at 894.
The court held that the plaintiff needed to provide expert testimony demonstrating that
obtaining a temporary restraining order against striking employees was a specialized area of
law and that an inexperienced attorney was negligent in taking such a case. id. The court
stated that although this was the attorneys first case of this type, he was not negligent per se.

Id.
66 See Barry, supra note 63, at 77.

Id. at 78.
58See Glidden v. Terranova, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 597, 599-99, 427 N.E.2d 1169, 1170
(1981). See also Pogonis v. Saab, 396 Mass. 1005,1005, 486 N.E.2d 28, 28 (1985)
(affirming attorney's motion for directed verdict holding plaintiff's case was fatally deficient
67
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claimed legal malpractice is so gross or obvious that laymen can rely on
their common knowledge or experience to recognize or infer negligence
from the facts." 69 Massachusetts courts have held that a violation of an
ethical or disciplinary rule does not constitute per se negligence, but if the
plaintiff can demonstrate that he is a member of the class which the rule
seeks to protect, a violation of the rule may be some evidence of the attorney's negligence. 70 In addition, "an expert on the duty of care of an attorney properly could base his opinion on an attorney's failure to conform to
a disciplinary rule.'
Expert testimony relating to ethical issues is inad72 A jury is capable of deciding ethical issues for itself.73
missible.
C. Attorney's Negligence Proximate Cause of Plaintiffs Injury

In a legal malpractice action, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has
lost a valuable right or would have obtained a better result in the underlying matter if the attorney exercised reasonable care.74 This requires a trial

due to lack of expert testimony); Harris v. Magri, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 349, 353, 656 N.E.2d
585, 587 (1995) (reversing decision because plaintiff failed to present expert testimony
establishing attorney's failure to excercise reasonable care and skill); Collucci, 25 Mass.
App. Ct. at 111-12, 515 N.E.2d at 894-95 (reversing jury verdict holding that plaintiff failed
to present expert testimony establishing attorney's negligence); Fall River Say. Bank v.
Callahan, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 76, 82, 463 N.E.2d 555, 560 (1984) (concurring with Glidden,
but holding that judge sitting without jury may supplement expert testimony with other
materials).
69 Glidden, 12 Mass. App. Ct. at 598, 427 N.E.2d at 1170. Accord Pogonis, 396
Mass. at 1005, 486 N.E.2d at 28; FallRiver Sav. Bank, 18 Mass. App. Ct. at 82, 463 N.E.2d
at 560; Wagenmann, 829 F.2d at 218-20.
70 Fishman v. Brooks, 396 Mass. 643, 649, 487 N.E.2d. 1377, 1381 (1986). See also
Fanaras Enterprises, Inc. v. Doane, 423 Mass. 121, 125, 666 N.E.2d 1003, 1006 (1996)
(holding no ethical violation where plaintiff unable to prove professional relationship as to
matter in question); Sullivan v. Birmingham, II Mass. App. Ct. 359, 369, 416 N.E.2d 528,
534 (198 1). "The canons of Ethics and Disciplinary Rules provide standards of professional
conduct of attorneys and not grounds for civil liability." 11 Mass. App. Ct. at 369, 416
N.E.2d at 534.
71Fishman, 396 Mass. at 650, 487 N.E.2d at 1381.
72 Id. at 650, 487 N.E.2d at 1382.
73 Id. (citing Perry v. Medeiros, 369 Mass. 836, 842, 343 N.E.2d 859 (1976)).
74 Fishman, 396 Mass. at 647, 487 N.E.2d at 1380. See also Poly v. Moylan, 423
Mass. 141, 145, 667 N.E.2d 250, 254, (1996) (holding plaintiff failed to provide evidence
that failure to regain custody of children was result of attorney negligence); Girardi v.
Gabriel, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 553, 560, 649 N.E.2d 805, 809 (1995). "The mere possibility
that the defendant's negligence caused harm is not sufficient to take issue to the jury." 38
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within a trial.75 The trier of fact in a legal malpractice action must hear all
that occurred at the original trial without expert testimony.76 The trier of
fact will
determine whether the attorney's negligence caused the plaintiff's
77
injury.

D. PlaintiffSuffered Actual Damages as a Result of Attorney's Negligence
It is not enough that the attorney is proven negligent in his duty to the
plaintiff, the negligence must result in some injury to the plaintiff.78 The
attorney's negligence must have made some difference to the client. 79 An
attorney who violates his duty to his client is liable for any reasonably
foreseeable loss caused by his negligence.80 Normally, damages are
strictly limited to the loss of property or other pecuniary interests. Damages are calculated as the difference between the judgment obtained
against the defendant in the underlying action and the amount the plaintiff
would have received but for the negligence of the attorney. In Wagenmann
v. Adams,81 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit allowed the plaintiff to recover emotional damages where the plaintiff was

Mass. App. Ct. at 560, 649 N.E.2d at 809; Colucci v. Rosen, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 107, 113,
515 N.E.2d 891, 895 (1987). "It need not be a perfect claim but it must have a probability
of success." 25 Mass. App. Ct. at 113, 515 N.E.2d at 895.
75 Fishman, 396 Mass. at 647, 487 N.E.2d at 1380.
76

Id.

77 Id. Accord Girardi,38 Mass. App. Ct. at 558, 649 N.E.2d at 808. "Generally the

issue of proximate cause is one of fact for the jury." 38 Mass. App. Ct. at 558, 649 N.E.2d
at 808.
78 See Fall River Say. Bank v. Callahan, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 76, 81,
463 N.E.2d 555,
560 (1984) (holding actual loss is an element of the tort of legal malpractice).
79 Jemigan v. Giard, 398 Mass. 721, 723, 500 N.E.2d 806, 807 (1986). "Former
clients suffer a loss due to an attorney's negligence only if that negligence is shown to have
made a difference to the client." Id. Se also Best v. Rome, 858 F. Supp. 271, 277-78
(1994). The Best court found that even if the plaintiff had established an attorney client
relationship with the union's attorney, he could not establish that the attorney was negligent
or that the alleged negligent behavior affected the outcome of the arbitration proceedings.
858 F. Supp. at 278.
80 Fishman v. Brooks, 396 Mass. 643, 646, 487 N.E.2d 1377, 1379 (1986). See also
McLellan v. Fuller, 226 Mass. 374, 377, 115 N.E.2d 752, 481 (1917). "There is no doubt
that for any misfeasance or unreasonable neglect of an attorney, whereby his client suffers a
loss, an action may be supported and damages recovered to the amount of that loss." 226
Mass. at 377, 115 N.E.2d at 48 1.
" 829 F.2d 196 (1st Cir. 1987).
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institutionalized as a result of his attorney's negligence. 2 In Wehringer v.
Powers and Hall,83 the District Court for the District of Massachusetts
suggested that the Supreme Judicial Court would allow emotional damages
in exceptional circumstances, but not necessarily limited to those cases
where the attorney's negligence effects plaintiff's personal liberty. 84 The
court stated that the exceptional circumstances must be a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the attorney's negligence.8 5
Beyond the rare cases involving emotional damages, the plaintiff cannot recover more from the attorney in a negligence suit than the plaintiff
could ultimately have recovered in the underlying cause of action. 86 For
this reason it is argued that Massachusetts courts should deduct any reasonable legal fees, contingent or otherwise, from the damages awarded to a
successful plaintiff in a legal malpractice case. 87 To do otherwise would
give the plaintiff a windfall. 88 Additionally, it would be adverse to public
policy to make legal malpractice suits more lucrative than the underlying
action. 89 Finally, the plaintiff must not only establish the attorney's negligence, but also must show that
any judgment against the original defendant
9
would have been collectible. 0

82

See id. at 222 (holding emotional damages resulting from client's loss of liberty was

reasonably forseeable injury of attorney's malpractice).
83 874 F. Supp. 425 (D. Mass. 1995).
84 Id. at 429.
This court believes that the California rule - permitting recovery for emotional
distress damages arising from legal malpractice only in exceptional
circumstances - would be followed by the courts of the commonwealth of
Massachusetts because it is based on the same considerations of forseeablility
and 'proximate cause' that inform Massachusetts law in the area of legal
malpractice.
Id.
85 Id. at 428-29. "Foreseeability is the touchstone of emotional distress analysis." Id.
(quoting Pleasant v. Celli, 18 Cal. App. 4th 841, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663 (1993)). In order to
receive emotional damages the plaintiff would have to meet the Massachusetts standard for
negligent infliction of emotional distress, namely, she must prove physical manifestations of
the underlying stress. Id.
86 Barry, supra note 63, at 80.
87 id.
88 id.
89 Id.

90 Jemigan v. Giard, 398 Mass. 721, 723, 500 N.E.2d 806, 807 (1986). The Supreme
Judicial Court affirmed the trial court judge's instruction to the jury that the plaintiff had to
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E. Statute of Limitations Considered

"Massachusetts has established a three year period for 'actions of
contract or tort for malpractice, error or mistake against attorneys ....,,91
In Massachusetts, however, a client's cause of action against an attorney
for legal malpractice does not accrue until the attorney's negligence is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered by the client.92 A
cause of action accrues when there occurs "a necessary coalescence of discovery and appreciable harm." 93 The Massachusetts courts hold that a client suffers appreciable harm immediately upon incurring additional legal
expenses as a result of an attorney's negligence.9 4
The Massachusetts courts adopted the continuing representation doctrine which recognizes that a client cannot be expected to second-guess his
attorney's performance as long as the attorney-client relationship continues.95 Thus, the statute of limitations does not begin to run on a legal malpractice claim until the attorney-client relationship has been terminated
96
with respect to the specific undertaking that is the subject of the suit.
"The doctrine only protects innocent reliance, however; where a client

prove that he could have collected something on any judgment he might have obtained from
the defendant in any underlying action. Id. See also Poly v. Moylan, 423 Mass. 141, 148,
667 N.E.2d 250, 255 (1996) (following Jernigan). Plaintiff failed to prove collectibility of
damages against an ex-wife in a child custody dispute. 423 Mass. at, 148, 667 N.E.2d at,
255; DiPiero v. Goodman, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 929, 930, 436 N.E.2d 998, 1000 (1982)
(holding defendant's failure to perfect service against plaintiffs ex-husband insufficient
evidence that plaintiff would have recovered the child support ordered by court).
91Hodas v. Sherburne, Powers, and Needham, 938 F. Supp. 58, 59 (D. Mass. 1996)
(interpreting MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 260 § 4).
92 See Hendrickson v. Sears, 365 Mass. 83, 91, 310 N.E.2d 131, 136 (1974) (adopting
discovery rule in legal malpractice cases). Accord Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 243,
565 N.E.2d 780, 784 (1991); Franklin v. Albert, 381 Mass. 611, 618-19, 411 N.E.2d 458,
459 (1980).
93See Cantu v. St. Paul Companies, 401 Mass. 53, 57-58, 514 N.E.2d 666, 668-69
(1987) (holding notice of harm, not knowledge of full extent of harm, is sufficient for cause
of action to accrue).
94 Id. Barry, supra 63 at 84-85.
9'See Murphy v. Smith, 411 Mass. 133, 137-38, 579 N.E.2d 165, 167-68 (1991)
(adopting continued representation doctrine); Hodas, 938 F. Supp. at 59 (denying
defendant's motion to dismiss where plaintiffs complaint sufficiently pled continuing
representation doctrine).
96See Murphy, 411 Mass. at 138, 579 N.E.2d at 168.
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knows that
something is wrong and goes ahead anyway, there can be no
97
tolling.,

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE LAW IN FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS

The Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Williams generally concurs
with the laws of other jurisdictions on the issue of legal malpractice. The
court, however, has taken a position contrary to most jurisdictions on the
issue of an attorney's liability where an issue of law is unsettled. Most
jurisdictions have adopted the error-in-judgment rule first announced in
McCullough v. Sullivan.98 The McCullough court held that a lawyer is not
an insurer or guarantor of his opinion and he is not answerable for an error
of judgment or for every mistake which might occur.99 The court in
Hodges v. Carter 1oo elaborated on the general duty of care owed by an
attorney to clients where the law is unsettled when it stated:
An attorney who acts in good faith and in honest belief that his advice and
acts are well founded and in the best interest of his client is not answerable
for a mere error of judgment or for a mistake in a point of law which has
not been settled by the court of last resort in his State and on
which rea01
sonable doubt may be entertained by well-informed lawyers.1

97 Cantu, 401 Mass. at 58, 514 N.E.2d at 669 (citing Greene v. Greene, 56 N.Y.2d 86,

93-94, 436 N.E.2d 496, 500, 451 N.Y.S.2d 46, 50 (1982)). See also Hodas, 938 F. Supp. at
59-60 (citing Cantu).
98 102 N.J.L. 381, 132 A. 102 (1926). Affirming trial court decision holding attorney
liable for failure to excercise reasonable care and skill in drafting a chattel mortgage for
plaintiff-client, that subsequently proved flawed and was invalid against general creditors of
plaintiffs debtor. Id.
99 Id. at 384, 132 A. at 103. The McCollough court held that an attorney:
[C]ontracts to use the reasonable knowledge and skill in the
transaction of business which lawyers of ordinary ability and skill
possess and excercise. On the one hand, he is not to be held
accountable for the consequences of every act which might be held to
be an error by a court. On the other hand, he is not immune from
responsibility if he fails to employ in the work he undertakes that
reasonable knowledge and skill excercised by lawyers of ordinary
ability and skill.
Id.
'00 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 (1954). Plaintiffs sought damages against attorney for
failing to secure proper service against insurance companies even though attorney filed
service with insurance commissioner. Id.
'o' Id. at 520, 80 S.E.2d at 146. Court held that attorneys were not negligent in
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This standard has been followed in virtually every jurisdiction. 10 2
An attorney will be held liable for any injury caused by his negligence
where a competent attorney could reasonably ascertain the state of the
law.1°3 An attorney, however, is not liable "solely according to an omniscience of hindsight."' °4 The question is whether the advice was so legally
deficient when given that a court may find an attorney has failed to carry
out his duties with the requisite skill and diligence commonly possessed
and exercised by lawyers of ordinary skill in the performance of the tasks
which they undertake. 10 5 The advice of an attorney should be judged on
the surrounding circumstances at the time that the advice or opinion was
given.
In Smith v. Lewis,' °6 the court clarified the error-in-judgment rule by
requiring the exercise of an informed judgment. The court provided:

"following a custom which had prevailed in this state for two decades or more" and which
attorneys throughout the state had generally taken for granted. Id.
102 See Halvorsen v. Ferguson, 46 Wash. App. 708, 717, 735 P.2d 675, 681 (1986).
Attorney is not liable where he did not "sufficiently emphasize" a legal principle on behalf
of his client. Id. "This rule has found virtually universal acceptance where the error
involves an uncertain, unsettled or debatable proposition of law." Id. See also Mills v.
Cooter, 647 A.2d 1118, 1122 (D.C. 1994). Attorney not liable where he believed legal
action was unwarranted and he made his opinion known to client well before Statute of
Limitations expired. 647 A.2d at 1122. "An attorney is not liable for an error of judgment
regarding an unsettled proposition of law." Id.; Kaufman v. Cahen, 507 So. 2d 1152, 1153
(Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (following Collins); Collins v. Wanner, 382 P.2d 105, 109 (Okla.
1963). The court stated "the rule has been followed in many jurisdictions that an attorney is
not liable for reaching a conclusion as to a controversial point of law which by subsequent
authoritative decision is proved to be erroneous." 382 P.2d at 109.
103 See George v. Caton, 93 N.M. 370, 377, 600 P.2d 822, 829 (1979) (reversing
summary judgment, court of appeals found attorney-client relationship based on attorney's
statement, "I will handle it"). Id. "If the law on the subject is well and clearly defined and
has existed and been published long enough to justify the belief that it was known to the
profession, a lawyer who disregards the rule or is ignorant of it renders him liable for losses
caused by such negligence or want of skill." Id.
104 See Meagher v. Kavli, 256 Minn. 54, 57, 97 N.W.2d 370, 373 (1959) (affirming
decision upholding judgment for attorneys seeking balance of fee due).
105Lucas v. Harm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 591, 364 P.2d 685, 689, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 825
(1961). The court found defendant attorney not liable for allegedly drafting a will whose
trust provisions violated the rule of perpetuities because they agreed that most attorneys of
ordinary skill have found the law confusing and fraught with traps for the unwary. Id.
106 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975) (holding attorney liable
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[A]n attorney does not ordinarily guarantee the soundness of his opinions
and, accordingly, is not liable for every mistake he may make in his practice. He is expected, however, to possess the knowledge of those elementary principles of law which are commonly known by well informed attorneys, and to discover those additional rules of law which, although not
commonly
known, may readily be found by standard research tech10 7
niques.
For an attorney to avoid liability where the law is unsettled at the time
his advice is given he must demonstrate that he conducted reasonable research into the state of the law at that time. ° 8 The two prong test is
whether: 1) the state of the law was unsettled at the time the professional
advice was rendered; and 2) whether the advice was based upon the execution of an informed judgment. The first question is answered by asking
if the issue has been settled by the court of last resort in the state and, if
not, if there is reasonable doubt entertained by well-informed lawyers as to
the current state of the law.1° 9 If the law is unsettled, one must "examine
the indicia of the law which were readily available to the defendant at the
time he performed the legal services in question."" 0 The factors to be
considered in determining if the attorney based his advice on an informed
judgment include: What steps did he take to ascertain the state of the law
at the time he rendered an opinion?;"' Did he rely on a single, outdated
precedent?;" 2 Did he check the advance sheets?" 3 Did he investigate
what other lawyers in his locality were doing in the area of law?;' 4 If the
attorney has conducted reasonable research into all the available and relevant sources and in good faith and honest belief acted in what he believes
is the best interest of his client, than he cannot be held liable for "failing to

for failing to assert plaintiffs community interest in her husband's retirement benefits).
'07 Id. at 358, 530 P.2d at 595, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
108

id.

109Id.

"o Id. at 356, 530 P.2d at 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. 625.
"' Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 356-61, 530 P.2d 589, 593-96, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621,
626-629 (1975).
12 See Aloy v. Mash, 38 Cal. 3d 413, 419, 696 P.2d 656, 659-60, 212 Cal. Rptr. 162,
165 (1985) (holding attorney relying on single 1941 case had not conducted sufficient
research to show informed judgment).
13 See Procanik v. Cillo, 206 N.J. Super. 270, 286, 502 A.2d 94, 102 (N.J. Super. Ct.

Law Div. 1985). "Attorneys are absolutely responsible for case law decisions as well as all
temporary supplemental official texts of the case law such as an advance sheet." Id.
114 Smith, 13 Cal. 3d at 356-61, 530 P.2d at 593-96, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621, 626-29.
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anticipate the manner in which the uncertainty will be resolved. ... " '
After conducting his research, the attorney may choose not to contest a
highly debatable point for strategic reasons, but "there is nothing strategic
or tactical about ignorance....,,16
In Williams, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the superior court's
holding that the attorneys at Gaston Snow provided a reasonable view of
the law at the time the opinion was given.' 17 The attorneys, however, were
held liable for having failed to alert their clients that the law had not been
conclusively resolved and of all possible outcomes that could arise.', 8
Therefore, the court concluded the attorneys denied their clients the ability
to make an informed decision in relation to their alternatives.1 9 The possible outcomes neglected by the attorneys consisted of a long and tenuous
list of contingent legal possibilities. 20 Namely, the attorneys did not warn
their clients that: the IRS might not acquiesce in the Eighth Circuit's 1973
Keinath decision, and that they might fight the decision in another circuit;
such a fight might lead to a conflict in the circuits; the United States Sugrant certiorari; and the law might be settled against the
preme Court might
2
position.'1
clients
In Davis v. Damrell,2 2 the California Court of Appeals for the First
District dealt with a similar fact pattern.123 In this case, a wife sued her
husband, a career military officer, for divorce.1 24 In 1970, she asked her
attorney, Damrell, if a community interest attached to her husband's federal military retirement pay.1 25 He advised her that Federal military pension did not constitute divisible community property. 26 In 1973, the exhusband retired and began to collect retirement benefits. 27 In 1974, the

115Id.at

358-59, 530 P.2d at 595, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 627 (citing and following Sprague
v. Morgan, 185 Cal. App. 2d 519, 523, 8 Cal. Rptr. 347, 350, (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960)).
116 Id. at 359, 530 P.2d at 595, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 627 (citing Pineda v. Craven, 424
F.2d 369, 372 (9th Cir. 1970)).
17 Williams v. Ely, 423 Mass. 463, 476, 668 N.E.2d 799, 806 (1996).
18Id.
19Id.
20 Id. at 471,668 N.E.2d at 803.
121 id.
122

119 Cal. App. 3d 883, 174 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1981).

123

id.

124Id. at

885, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 258.

125

id.

126

Id.

127

Davis v. Damrell, 119 Cal. App. 3d 883, 885, 174 Cal. Rptr. 257, 258 (1981).
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California Supreme Court held that vested retirement benefits, including
federal military pensions, constituted community property subject to division in divorce.
Following the Smith court's holding that an attorney
must exercise an informed judgment in order to avoid a charge of professional negligence, the plaintiff in Damrell brought suit against attorney
Damrell claiming "that [Damrell's] failure to advise her of the unsettled
state of the relevant law deprived her of the opportunity to actively litigate
and pursue such
unsettled points of law and this amounted to professional
29
negligence.'
The Damrell court applied the two prong test of Smith to determine if
the defendant had failed in his duty to his client.1 30 The court determined
that the law in 1970, when the opinion was rendered, was unsettled.3
Furthermore, the court concluded that an attorney's failure to anticipate the
future resolution of an unsettled point of law, especially where there is a
"180 degree shift in the law," cannot serve as the basis for legal malpractice where the attorney's advice was ultimately held erroneous but was
based on an informed judgment. 32 The court reasoned:
While in hindsight that professional advice ultimately proved erroneous,
nonetheless it represented a reasoned excercise of an informed judgment
grounded upon a professional evaluation of applicable legal principles.
Under such uncontroverted circumstances, respondent's [Damrell's] error
in judgment133on a question of law is immune from a claim of professional
negligence.
The court strongly denounced the appellant-client's contention that
Mr. Damrell was under a duty to advise her of the unsettled state of the law

Id. at 885-86, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
129 Id. at 886, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 258-59.
130 Id. at 887, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
131Id. at 888, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
132 Davis v. Damrell, 119 Cal. App. 3d 883, 888, 174 Cal. Rptr. 257, 260 (1981).
128

131Id. at 888-89, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 260. See also Cianbro Corp. v. Jeffcoat and Martin,

804 F. Supp. 784, 789 (D.S.C. 1992). "As a general proposition, '[a] legal malpractice
action is unlikely to succeed when the attorney erred because an issue of law was unsettled
or debatable. The perfect vision and wisdom of hindsight is an unreliable test for
determining the past existence of legal malpractice"'. Cianbro Corp.; 804 F. Supp. at 789.
Mills v. Cooter, 647 A.2d 1118, 1122 (D.C. 1994) ("An informed judgment, even if
subsequently proven to be erroneous, is not negligence").
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at the time the advice was rendered.134 The court stated that although an
attorney owes a duty to provide sound advice to a client:
[S]uch obligation does not include a duty to advise on all possible alternatives no matter how remote or tenuous. To impose such an extraordinary
duty would effectively undermine the attorney-client relationship and vitiate the salutary purpose of the error-in-judgment rule. As a matter of
policy, an attorney should not be required to compromise or attenuate an
otherwise sound excercise of informed judgment with added advice concerning the unsettled nature of relevant legal principles....To require the
attorney to further advise a client of the uncertainty in the law would render the excercise of such professional judgment meaningless.... In short,
rests upon consideration of
the excercise of sound professional judgment
35
legal perception and not prescience.'
This reasoning directly conflicts with the holding in Williams that expands
the duty to disclose material facts to include the duty to warn of all potential risks.' 36
In Procanick v. Cillo,137 the Superior Court of New Jersey ruled in
favor of plaintiffs who brought suit against medical malpractice attorneys
to whom plaintiffs' case was referred by their attorney. 38 The malpractice
attorneys issued an opinion advising the plaintiffs that the settled law in
the area of wrongful birth cases was not in their favor. 139 The malpractice
attorneys, however, were found negligent where they withheld their personal opinion that the settled law was "ripe for reconsideration" and failed
to inform plaintiffs that the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed its position shortly after issuing their opinion.' 40 The superior court held that
the attorneys had a duty to give the clients all the relevant information in
complete form.' 4 ' The court stated:
[TIhis duty is not one to guaranty a change in the law, but rather to be
aware that a realistic probability exists that the settled law is likely to be
reconsidered.... It should be clear that this duty is not to be confused

134

Davis v. Damrell, 119 Cal. App. 3d 883, 889, 174 Cal. Rptr. 257, 260 (1981).

131 Id. at 889, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
136

423 Mass. at 477, 668 N.E.2d at 806.

137206 N.J. Super. 270, 502 A.2d 94 (N.J.L. 1985), rev'd, and remanded 226 N.J.

Super. 132, 543 A.2d 985 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988).
138

id.

Id. at 276 n.2, 502 A.2d at 97 n.2.
Id. at 285, 502 A.2d at 102.
14 Id. at 287, 502 A.2d at 102.
'40
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with hindsight or prescience. This duty does not require clairvoyance or
the ability to predict as a prophet that the change in the law, in fact, will
occur.

142

Procanick is distinguishable from Williams in that the law in question
in Procanick was ripe for reconsideration. 143 The change in the law had
been heralded in law journals, case law, and advance sheets almost contemporaneous with the issuing of the opinion by the defendant attorneys. 44 By contrast, Williams involved advice given in 1975 and 1976
which was considered a reasonable interpretation of the law up until it was
overturned by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1982.' 45
In 1988, however, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, reversed and remanded the Procanik decision.4' The court found
that an attorney-client relationship did not exist, rather there was an affirmative refusal of the professional undertaking.' 4 7 More importantly, the
court held that even if there had been an attorney-client relationship, "it is
not a professional dereliction for [an attorney] to withhold his gratuitous
prediction of the prospect of success of an appeal which would be taken to
obtain a change in the law."' If the law is settled, an attorney is expected
to know it, but "if the law is unsettled, debatable or doubtful, he is not required to be correct,. . . but only to exercise an informed judgment based
on a reasoned professional evaluation."' 49 Where an attorney is not required to anticipate the view that the court may ultimately express with
respect to unsettled law, neither can he be expected to anticipate changes
in the settled law. 150 If a lawyer believes that a settled point of law might
change, he can satisfy his duty by pointing this out and explaining the various developments in the law. An attorney, however, should not be required to accompany such a legal opinion with a prediction of the likeli-

142 Procanick

v. Cillo, 206 N.J. Super. 270, 287, 502 A.2d 94, 103 (N.J.L. 1985),

rev'd, and remanded 226 N.J. Super. 132, 543 A.2d 985 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988).
141 Id. at 285, 502 A.2d at 101-02.
" Id. at 286, 502 A.2d at 102.
Williams v. Ely, 423 Mass. 467, 476, 668 N.E.2d 799, 807 (1996).
146 Procanik v. Cillo, 226 N.J. Super 132, 543 A.2d 985 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1988).
147Id. at 146, 543 A.2d at 992.
'48 Id. at 149, 543 A.2d at 994.
145

Id. at 150, 543 A.2d at 994 (citing Davis v. Damrell, 119 Cal. App. 3d 883, 174
Cal. Rptr. 257, 259 (1981)).
150 Procanik v. Cillo, 226 N.J. Super. 132, 150, 543 A.2d 985, 994 (1988).
'49
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hood that he can bring about that change in the law."' The appellate court
further stated that due to the fluid and flexible nature of the law, "that
which seems indisputably correct today may be deemed clearly erroneous
tomorrow. Conversely, that which now appears erroneous may in the future be revealed as correct."' 152 Since the Williams' court held that the advice given by Gaston Snow was reasonable at the time, one must conclude
that the attorneys are being penalized for following53 an erroneous view
which the ordinary lawyer would perceive as correct.1
In Cianbro v. Jeffcoat and Martin,154 the court found a duty existed to
advise clients in some circumstances of uncertainty in the law.
Undoubtedly, if an attorney has a reason to believe, or should have reason
to believe that there could be some adverse consequences from taking a
particular course of action, the attorney is obligated to advise the client of
the possible courses of action or, failing that, to act
55 in the most conservative fashion so as to protect the client's interests.
This was not the case in Williams. Although the law in the area in
question had not been conclusively resolved, the attorney gave reasonable
advice based on an informed judgment at the time it was given. There
were no indications in 1975 or 1976 that any of the possible legal risks that
occurred were on the horizon. In fact, Gaston Snow was in the situation
described by the Cianbro court which carves out an exception to this duty
to warn of the unsettled nature of the law:
[11f there is no reasonable ground for the attorney to believe that his advice is questionable, he certainly has no obligation to advise clients of
every remote possibility that might exist or to act prematurely when there
is no apparent reason to do so.
Finally, it appears that the Williams' court is saying that an attorney
owes a duty to a client to inform him of changes in the law relating to past
opinions. Arguably the attorney-client relationship between the Gaston
Snow firm and the plaintiffs ended in 1976 when the advice was given and
the firm filed the proper documents in the appropriate registries. The purpose of the relationship had been accomplished. Not until 1982 was the
law settled adversely to the plaintiffs position. Thus, some troubling ques1s'
Id. at 150-51,543 A.2d at 995.
152 Id. at 151, 543 A.2d at 995.
153Id.

15,804 F. Supp. 784 (D.S.C. 1992).
155
Id. at
156 id.

793.
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tions arise as a result of the Williams decision. How did the court find a
duty on the part of the attorneys to notify the plaintiffs of this change in the
law post termination? How did the court find liability for advice that represented a reasonable and valid view of the law for the six year period
between its issuance and the ultimate settlement of the issue by the Supreme Court in 1982?
V. CONCLUSION

In Williams v. Ely, the court concluded that the advice the attorneys
provided their clients was a reasonable view of the law at the time. If their
opinion was reasonable, the court must concede that the attorneys had conducted reasonable research and that their opinion was based on an informed judgment. To hold attorneys liable for an unforeseen shift in the
law negates the error-in-judgment rule. Gaston Snow provided the plaintiffs with a reasonable opinion of the law at the time and filed the appropriate documents by January 1976. It is difficult to accept that they are
liable to clients whose relationship with the firm ended in 1976, for an
opinion given in 1975, which was based on case law from 1973, particularly because the court admits the advice constituted a reasonable view of
the law at the time and the law remained unsettled until 1982. Based
solely on the language of Hendrickson v. Sears'57 , which stated that an
attorney has a duty to disclose all material facts to a client in order that he
can make an informed decision, the Supreme Judicial Court has found a
duty to warn clients of all potential risks involved where the law is unsettled.
In Williams v. Ely the Supreme Judicial Court has made a statement
that is broad and ambiguous. Traditionally, attorneys were not liable for a
mere error in judgment where the attorney based his opinion on an informed judgment. The decision in Williams now requires an attorney to
warn a client of the unsettled nature of the law. The question remains
open as to whether this requires a warning in every situation regardless of
how slight or remotely possible a shift in the law may be. All law is unsettled if we extend the court's logic far enough. This ruling is contrary to
the law in other jurisdictions as stated by Davis v. Damrell, Procanick v.
Cillo, and Cianbro v. Jeffcoat and Martin, which hold that an attorney has
no duty to warn a client of every remote potential change in the law. A
duty to warn exists where there is reason to doubt the soundness of the
opinion. The court's decision in this case presumes that there was a reason
to doubt the soundness of Gaston Snow's opinion. To reach such a conclusion, however, requires the firm to partake in an excercise in probabilities. How probable is it that the Internal Revenue Service will fight this
365 Mass 83, 90, 310 N.E.2d 131, 136 (1974).
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decision in another circuit? How probable is it that the Circuit Court of
Appeals elsewhere will decide differently than Keinath? How likely is it
that this issue will reach and be resolved by the United States Supreme
Court? The holding in Williams requires attorneys to make predictions
about the course of action of various parties and the ultimate resolution of
an issue.
Finally, the decision in Williams puts Massachusetts attorneys in an
untenable position. Advising a client that the law is unsettled will certainly lead the client to ask his attorney what they should do, and the attorney will then render an opinion. If he advises his client to follow either
course, and that course proves wrong, the attorney may be liable. For these
reasons, law firms and attorneys now issue opinions with disclaimers of
liability attached. Disclaimers are a perfectly legitimate method for attorneys to protect themselves from liability. Finding a duty to warn a client
of all possible risks where the law is unsettled will lead to an increase in
the practice of disclaiming liability for opinions. Out of fear of being held
liable for negligence based on hindsight in future unforeseen lawsuits, attorneys are now afraid to stand by their own professional judgment. What
good is an opinion that is accompanied by a clause that essentially states
that the attorney who rendered the opinion is unwilling to stand by his
work? This will not benefit a profession that is already beleaguered by
negative stereotypes.
In the future, the Supreme Judicial Court should consider the following in dealing with cases of legal malpractice where the law is unsettled.
First, the court should apply the Smith two prong test to determine if the
law is unsettled at the time the advice was given, and, if so, whether the
attorney exercised reasonable skill and diligence in seeking to ascertain the
state of the law at the time the opinion was given. The focal question
should be whether the advice given is so legally deficient so as to violate
the standard of care. Second, the court should determine if there are any
reasonable grounds for an attorney, in the defendant's position, to believe
that the advice given was questionable or subject to adverse consequences.
If so, the court then needs to ask whether this amounts to a duty to warn
the client of the adverse consequences of a particular alternative? By analyzing the facts using this framework the court will be able to protect clients who are the victims of unsound advice where the law is unsettled.
Meanwhile, attorneys who excercise due care and employ reasonable research techniques in order to render sound opinions will stand by their
opinions without the fear of liability for any remotely possible or unforeseen shifts in the law for which they did not warn their client.
Paul Toner

